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Abstract:  
This paper presents the experimental results of a “Transcontinental Ultimatum Game” 
implemented between India and France. We use a standard ultimatum game, but in one 
treatment Indian subjects made offers to French subjects (ItoF treatment) and, in another 
treatment, French subjects made offers to Indian subjects (FtoI treatment). We observed that 
FtoI treatment bargaining mostly ended up with unequal splits of money in favor of French, 
while nearly equal splits were the most frequent outcome in ItoF treatment interactions.  
The experimental results are organized through a standard social reference model, 
modified for taking into account the different marginal value of money for bargainers. In our 
model bargaining is driven by relative standings comparisons between players, occurring in 
terms of real earnings (that is monetary earnings corrected for a purchasing power factor) 
obtained in the game. The norm of equity behind the equalization of real earnings is called 
local equity norm, and contrasted to a global equity norm which would encompass the wealth 
of players beyond the game. According to what we observed, no beyond-game concern seems 
to be relevantly endorsed by subjects. 
 
Keywords:  Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, Fairness, Bargaining experiment, 
Ultimatum Game 
JEL code:  A15, C70, C91, D63  
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1. Introduction 
What is an “equitable share”? 
Unlike most normative theories of justice, positive economic theory has traditionally done 
without interpersonal comparisons of utilities. Empirical work however greatly challenges this 
received view and highlights that, when justice norms and fairness concerns influence 
behaviors, an accurate positive theory needs to embody interpersonal comparisons of utilities. 
This comparison always rests on some underlying notion of equally or equity. But what is to 
be equalized is a matter of debate (Sen, 1992) and the notion of equity has to be refined. 
While relative standing comparisons models (Charness and Rabin, 2002, Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999) account for bargaining interactions driven by fairness consideration, they usually rest 
on the assumption of equal marginal value of money. This paper mainly aims at relaxing this 
assumption and raises the question of what are the relevant interpersonal comparisons of 
utilities in an experimental setting when money is differently worth to players. Even in such a 
simple context, the question of what is an “equitable” outcome is not obvious, and various 
views of what is a practical justice implies providing different answers. This paper considers 
the three following alternative views5: 
- Along the baseline view, inter-personal comparisons of well-being do not have any 
role in shaping distribution. For instance, if a certain quantity of a divisible good has to be 
divided between two individuals they should each receive half of it, whoever they are. Call 
this view "Formal equity". 
- Along a second view every occasion should be used to reduce as much as possible 
inequalities. For instance if a (divisible) good has to be divided between a poor and a rich 
individual, the largest part should a priori be given to the poor one. Interpersonal comparisons 
of utilities encompass the whole situation of the individuals and not only the local gain 
obtained from the interaction. This view can be referred as "Compensation” or “Global 
equity". 
                                                 
5 The first view is a standard view in theories of distributive justice, while the second and the third ones, 
although partly related to the conceptions of local and global equity (Elster, 1993), are specifically introduced 
and discussed in this paper with respect to our experimental setting.  
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- Finally, a third view recommends the equalization of the local benefits that individuals 
draw from a given situation. It relies on inter-personal comparisons of these benefits, and only 
of these. For instance, suppose that a (divisible) good has to be divided between two persons 
and that, from every unit of the good, the first person draws a lower benefit than the second; 
then the first person should receive more units of the good that the second. Call this view 
"Local equity". 
The goal of this paper is to test these three competing views. To that aim, we designed and 
ran a bargaining laboratory experiment, a standard ultimatum game, where rich and poor 
subjects played against each other and where the stake over which subjects bargained was 
differently worth to them.  
The participants were drawn from countries living under different economic conditions and 
the diversity was controlled along two dimensions: the income and the purchasing power. 
With respect to the first point, we chose a high level of income country (France) and a low 
level of income country (India). With respect to the second point (real value of money), the 
bargaining was done in US dollars and actual exchange rates were used to convert dollar pay-
offs to final pay-offs (Indian and French subjects received pay-offs respectively converted 
into Indian rupees and into euros).  
The implications of the three aforementioned Justice Views in the context of 
transcontinental game between Indian and French are straightforward and contrasted. The 
Formal Equity view would maintain that Indian and French receive the same amount of 
dollars. The Compensation View would recommend that Indian students receive more in the 
game as, overall, they are worst-off than French students. Finally, since the actual exchange 
rates and the prices structures are such that, for a given amount of money, Indian students can 
buy more than French students, the Local Equity view would advocate that French should 
receive more in the bargaining.  
It is well known that Justice norms are relevant for describing individual behavior in 
bargaining situations in general and ultimatum games in particular. Norms provide reference 
points to the individuals, who can either directly implement the norm or anchor their strategic 
reasoning to a common reference. This allows raising the main question of this paper: Which 
(if any) notion of Equity is relevant in order to describe bargaining behavior?  
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The Ultimatum game: standard results and explanations. 
To test the various views of practical justice, we implemented an Ultimatum Game 
(henceforth UG). In the UG two individuals have to reach an agreement about how to divide a 
good that is valuable to both them: a sum of money, a stake, a pie. In the sequential form of 
the UG, the first player (the sender) makes an offer about the division of the pie to the second 
player (the receiver). If the receiver accepts the offer, she receives the offered amount while 
the sender’s payoff is the stake minus the offer. If the receiver rejects the offer, both players 
obtain a zero payoff. 
Under the assumptions that players are rational, risk-neutral and have perfect and common 
knowledge, standard theory predicts that the receiver accepts any offer made by the sender. 
Any division of the stake is sustained by a Nash equilibrium, even the one where the sender 
makes an offer of zero to the receiver (and the latter accepts). In the sequential version of the 
UG, however, there is a unique sub-game-perfect equilibrium: the dominant strategy for the 
receiver is to accept any offer, even the smaller one say epsilon. In the larger sub-game 
(which, in the UG, coincides with the game it-self) the strategy of the sender is to offer 
epsilon. 
UG has been the object of an extensive experimental work since the first experiment 
reported by Güth et al., (1992). This is for at least two reasons: the simplicity of the game and 
the large empirical puzzling evidence on it. The most striking observations are the following: 
offers that are inferior to the 20% of the stake are rejected with a probability that exceeds one-
half, and the average offer is between 30 and 40% of the stake, depending on how high the 
probability of rejection is anticipated by the senders6.  
The discrepancy between theory and empirical evidence has proved to be very robust to the 
experimental protocol retained (where factors like context, subjects, kind and size of the 
stake, numbers of rounds, etc. have been variously specified; see Camerer, 2003, for an 
extensive discussion). In particular, UG was experimented in different countries7 (since Roth 
                                                 
6 For surveys on the UG the reader is referred to Güth (1995), Roth (1995),or Camerer (2003). 
7 We are not aware of Indian studies or between countries ultimatum games.  
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et al., 1991, and Buchan et al., 1997). Although observations may differ from one country to 
another, the main qualitative findings are robust, as showed by Oosterbeek et al (2004)8. 
Several explanations have been provided to reconcile the apparent inconsistency of 
standard theory and empirical evidence. Most of them paid attention to the social norms that 
individuals would bring into the game and that would affect their behavior beyond what 
standard theory commonly assumes. According to these explanations, the utility that players 
may derive from the game would incorporate social considerations such as the relative 
standing of each player after the bargaining is concluded, and the way the agreement is 
reached. On one hand, a large set of models has focused on the feelings of envy or of injustice 
that very unequal bargaining outcomes trigger. The degree of envy or aversion to inequality 
determines to what extent a division of the stake will be accepted when it is different from the 
equal split (Bolton 1991, Fehr and Schmidt 1999). On the other hand, models of intentional or 
reciprocal behavior (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Firchsteiger 1998) assume that a relevant 
rationale for action is to reciprocate what one’s opponent is expected to do or to reciprocate 
what she actually does. Models of intentional or reciprocal behavior also incorporate notions 
of fairness or justice, not directly as an argument of the individual’s utility function, but 
mediated by the individual’s understanding of what is the norm in a given circumstance. 
Fairness is a rewarding response to fairness as well as unfairness is a retaliating response to 
selfishness; in the UG, a receiver accepts an offer only when she considers it is sufficiently 
fair and rejects it otherwise.   
Interpersonal comparisons and the transcontinental design 
In most experiments the assumption that the marginal value of money is the same for all 
players is reasonable, since subjects are anonymously drawn from the same population; hence 
ex-ante inequality (or other “inborn” difference) cannot be taken into consideration.9 On the 
                                                 
8 The most remarkable exceptions are the UG experiments run in 17 small-scale societies by Heinrich et al. 
(2001). Overall, offers varied substantially among these societies and rejections’ behaviors were less 
homogenous than usual. However, no clear pattern emerged: in some societies rejections barely occurred -even 
at very low offers- while in some others respondents behaved very toughly, rejecting even equal split. As a 
plausible explanation of such variability, authors put forward the diversity of social institutions and fairness 
norms across these societies. These studies are not directly relevant for us, since France and India are large-scale 
societies in which money is the usual mean of exchange. 
9 In the standard version of the UG the amount to be divided is equal for both players, thus “a token is a 
token” for both the sender and the receiver. If it is common knowledge that (a) the monetary value of the token is 
the same for both players and (b) the utility of money is the same for both players, it is correct to assume that the 
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other hand, two players that are not ex-ante equally wealthy may give a different marginal 
value to the money earned in the negotiation.  
Although they do not relax the assumption of identical marginal value of money, Kagel 
et al. (Kagel et al. 1996) discuss how comparison of utilities can affect individual behavior 
when players negotiate over tokens with different monetary values. They can test whether the 
relevant rule for action is the willingness to compensate for different final utilities (expressed 
in real pay-offs). Two different exchange rates are used to convert experiment token payoffs 
in actual money payoffs, higher exchange rate for the sender or for the receiver.10 
Experimental evidence suggests that when senders had higher exchange rate, offers were at 
about the formally equal split during the first three rounds of the game and increased 
afterward as rejection rates were very high (53%). When receivers had higher conversion 
rates, senders’ offers were not materially different from the equal money split offer (25 out of 
100). On average, rejection rates were 14%. Hence, formal equality does not appear as the 
unique and absolute sharing norm.  
The main innovation in our experimental design is the following. We let it be common 
knowledge that players participating in the ultimatum game were different ex-ante in two 
respects. First, they most likely had a different monetary value of the experimental currency 
(US dollar) because with one dollar one can buy much more goods in India than in France 
(about four or five times more). In a certain way, for this part of the design, we replicate the 
protocol of Kagel et al.. Second, they also probably had a different overall income because 
the per capita GDP is much larger in France than in India (about 50 times larger when the 
sessions of the experiment were conducted). With respect to Kagel et al.’s study, this second 
element is original. Our goal is to study how this twofold source of diversity between players 
(the game-related one and the actual life-circumstances one) affects the comparison of utility 
that players perform during the bargaining. The design of the experiment consists of 
"transcontinental" treatments (sender and receiver from different countries) and of "national" 
or "within country" treatments (sender and receiver from the same country) as a benchmark.  
                                                                                                                                                        
marginal value of one token left for the receiver is equal to the marginal value of the token the sender renounces 
to. 
10 If fairness is the relevant rationale for action in this design, the following results should be observed: when 
the exchange rate is higher for the sender, he should offer more than the equal split in order to grant both herself 
and her opponent with the same amount of money. By contrast, when the receiver benefits from a hight 
exchange rate, the sender should offer less than the equal split. In both cases, it is assumed that the division of 
the stake is the mean by which final utility of money equality is achieved. 
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As explained above, interpersonal comparison between players may in principle occur at 
different levels and thus variously influence their behavior in the game. Our results clearly 
point out that the relevant reference point for such comparison is the equality in real terms of 
game-related pay-offs, which is consistent with the Local benefits theory of distributive 
justice and inconsistent with both the Compensation and the Formal equity theories. 
The plan of the paper is the following: Section 2 describes the experimental protocol and 
the results. Section 3 is devoted to the theory: we develop four variants of the linear Aversion 
to Inequity model (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) that allow distinguishing between local and 
global notions of inequity expressed in real or nominal terms. On the basis of these models, 
we can submit the conclusion that the relevant notion of Inequity is the local one expressed in 
real terms. Section 4 briefly discusses the relevance of this point with respect to our 
understanding of which kinds of justice norms are internalized by the individuals. 
2. The experiment 
The experimental protocol11 
The design of the experiment consists of four treatments. Two treatments are 
transcontinental: FtoI (a French sender makes an offer to an Indian receiver) and ItoF (an 
Indian sender makes an offer to a French receiver). And two treatments are within-country 
benchmark treatments: ItoI (an Indian sender makes an offer to an Indian receiver) and FtoF 
(a French sender makes an offer to a French receiver). 
 
Type of treatment Transcontinental Transcontinental Within-country Within-country 
Treatment Sender : Indian 
Receiver : French 
Sender : French 
Receiver : Indian 
Sender : Indian 
Receiver : Indian 
Sender : French 
Receiver : French 
Code of treatment ItoF FtoI ItoI FtoF 
Table 1. Experimental Treatments 
In both transcontinental and within-country experiments, twenty subjects participated in each 
session and played six one-shot Ultimatum Games with the “absolute stranger” protocol. In 
                                                 
11 The reader is referred to the appendix for the English version of the instructions distributed to the subjects. 
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each game, the amount to be divided was 10 US dollars, offers could be made in halves of 
dollar and two games out of six were paid. The conversion rate used for the payment was the 
current exchange rate of the US dollar into the local currency (Euro and Indian Rupee)12. The 
exchange rates used were common knowledge. Moreover, the subjects received a sum of 2 
US dollars for showing up at the experiment.  
For the transcontinental treatments, the subjects were indicated that they were to play 
with Indian (French) students, and that the game decisions would have been transmitted via an 
Internet-Chat Connection. Some basic pieces of information were provided to subjects: the 
per capita GDP of India and France. In addition, the instructions specified the purchasing 
power of one dollar in each country, by indicating the price in US dollars of selected 
commodities in both countries. For this purpose, we selected items that were likely to be part 
of students’ expenditures in both countries: coffee in the university campus, cinema ticket, 
music CD etc.13 
The experiment was run with a paper and pencil protocol. To make easier the logistics of 
the experiment, a single treatment is apply for each session. In transcontinental sessions 
experimentalist in each country transmitted decisions through an Internet-Chat Connection. In 
each country, the subjects were gathered in a classroom and received the instructions and the 
experimental material (game-cards, ID, envelopes). After the instructions were read and a test 
of understanding had been conducted, the experiment was started. In the senders’ classroom, 
the subjects were asked to write down their offer and to put the offer in the envelope. Once all 
the subjects had finished, the envelopes were collected and transmitted by the experimentalist 
to the other country. Offers were then copied in the receivers’ cards and distributed to the 
subjects; the receivers were then asked to take their decision to accept or to reject the offer. 
The receivers’ cards were then collected, and acceptances and refusals were transmitted to the 
senders in the other country. For the within-country experiment the procedure was roughly the 
same with the exception of decisions transmission. In the latter treatments, in fact, senders and 
receivers sat in two different rooms and communication of subjects’ decision was carried out 
in a third room by experimentalists. The procedure was repeated six times. Then the random 
                                                 
12 The exchange rate used for Euro was $1 for €1.1. The exchange rate used for Indian Rupee was $1 for 
47 Rps. 
13 For a complete presentation of purchasing power information used in the experiment, the reader is referred 
to the instructions in the appendix. 
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drawing was done and the two selected rounds for the final payment were communicated to 
subjects.  
French students received instructions in French and Indian students received instructions in 
English. A special attention was paid to the instructions’ translation: the instructions were 
firstly drafted in English following standard UG instructions; they were then translated into 
French. The final version of instructions in both languages was done after a common revision, 
in order to make instructions equally understandable for all the subjects. 
 Main predictions 
Taking into account the characteristics of the Transcontinental Protocol (difference of 
beyond-game status, difference of purchasing power, equal nominal value of the stake), one 
may expect three kinds of behavior.  
If the nominal value of the stake matters, then no different behavior should be observed in 
transcontinental treatments with respect to previous within country experiments, nor one 
should find any significant differences between FtoI and ItoF treatments. The modal 
observation should be the equal nominal split. 
If the first factor (beyond-game wealth effect) is relevant, we should observe that the 
outcomes of bargaining are always in favor of Indian subjects (the interaction would allow for 
compensation between ex ante differences between players).  
Finally, if the second factor plays a crucial role (different value of one dollar in the two 
countries), then we should observe unequal splits occurring in the opposite direction, that is in 
favor of French subjects. The rationale behind this peculiar division is to equalize the real 
pay-off of players.  
As specified above, our hypothesis is that the country of residence of players may play a 
role in shaping the interpersonal comparison of utility. Specifically, we do not assume that 
cultural norms themselves exert such an influence but, instead, that the country of residence 
of the players indirectly affects the equity norm that sustains the agreement: the equity norm 
is endogenously settled as to account for the differences of purchasing power and of income 
between the two countries. In principle, however, we cannot rule out the fact that Indian 
subjects and French subjects behave differently in ultimatum games for reasons intrinsically 
related to their culture. It is thus necessary to provide a counter-proving test, which 
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invalidates the cultural discrimination story. The comparison between within-country 
treatments is the natural test for this latter point. 
No standard experimental test of the Ultimatum Game has previously been conducted in India 
or France (to our knowledge), so we needed benchmarks cases to be compared with 
transcontinental treatments. The objective of running with-in country treatments is twofold. 
First, it allows establishing if bargaining behavior is the same than that previously observed 
using an almost identical protocol and in countries like United States, Israel, Japan etc. In 
particular, we want to see if there are any differences between French to French negotiation 
and Indian to Indian one. Secondly and more importantly, we want to compare the within 
country and the transcontinental treatments to test whether the identity of the subjects affect 
bargaining outcomes. The within-India and within-France treatments were conducted with the 
same nominal stake of $10. Note that, in real terms, the stake is thus higher in the Indian 
treatment. 
3. Results 
All in all, we ran eleven sessions during 2002 and 2003. Six transcontinental sessions 
between Delhi and Grenoble were organized: three ItoF sessions, and three FtoI sessions. 
Moreover, three ItoI sessions were run in Delhi and two FtoF sessions were run in Grenoble.14 
On the whole, the results of the FtoF sessions are consistent with the usual results of standard 
ultimatum game experiments. That is why we only ran two sessions with this treatment. The 
date and the average earning of each session are reported in Table 2. On average, within-
country sessions lasted one hour, while transcontinental sessions lasted one hour and half. 
                                                 
14 A pilot session was run for the transcontinental protocol of the UG. This allowed improving some aspects 
of the experimental procedure and checking the feasibility and the effectiveness of the experimental 
communications between countries. 
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Session 
ID 
Date Treatment Number 
of 
subjects 
Average 
Earning in US$ 
Average Earning in 
Local Currency 
(Rps: Indian Rupees, € 
: Euro) 
ItoF-S1 02/19/2002 Indian Senders- 
French Receivers 
10 
couples 
Senders: $10.75 
Receivers: $7.42 
Senders: 515 Rps 
Receivers: €8.1 
ItoF-S2 02/21/2002 Indian Senders- 
French Receivers 
10 
couples 
Senders: $8.77 
Receivers: $8.15 
Senders: 420 Rps 
Receivers: €9 
ItoF-S3 02/11/2003 Indian Senders- 
French Receivers 
10 
couples 
Senders: $10.75 
Receivers: $8.27 
Senders: 515 Rps 
Receivers: €9.1 
FtoI-S1 02/20/2002 French Senders- 
Indian Receivers 
10 
couples 
Senders: $14.45 
Receivers: $6.85 
Senders: €15.9 
Receivers: 330 Rps 
FtoI-S2 02/22/2002 French Senders- 
Indian Receivers 
10 
couples 
Senders: $17.35 
Receivers: $6.45 
Senders: €19.1 
Receivers: 310 Rps 
FtoI-S3 02/12/2003 French Senders- 
Indian Receivers 
10 
couples 
Senders: $14.8 
Receivers: $7.9 
Senders: €16.3 
Receivers: 380 Rps 
ItoI-S1 02/18/2002 Indian Senders- 
Indian Receivers 
10 
couples 
Senders: $14.4 
Receivers: $6.6 
Senders: 682 Rps 
Receivers: 321 Rps 
ItoI-S2 02/03/2003 Indian Senders- 
Indian Receivers 
10 
couples 
Senders: $13.2 
Receivers: $7.6 
Senders: 634 Rps 
Receivers: 365 Rps 
ItoI-S3 02/03/2003 Indian Senders- 
Indian Receivers 
10 
couples 
Senders: $11.2 
Receivers: $7.7 
Senders: 538 Rps 
Receivers: 370 Rps 
FtoF-S1 10/23/2002 French Senders- 
French Receivers 
10 
couples 
Senders: $13.1 
Receivers: $9.1 
Senders: €14.3 
Receivers: €10.1 
FtoF-S2 10/24/2002 French Senders- 
French Receivers 
11 
couples 
Senders: $13.1 
Receivers: $9.1 
Senders: €14.3 
Receivers: €10.1 
Table 2. Sessions details 
As already explained, every subject played consecutively six ultimatums, changing 
opponent at each new round. For each session, the main statistics by treatment for all periods 
polled and for the last period are reported in Table 3.  
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Sessions FtoF15 ItoF ItoI FtoI 
Number of 
observations 
120 
(20) 
180 
(30) 
180 
(30) 
180 
(30) 
Average Offer 3.48 
(3.70) 
3.92 
(3.87) 
3.53 
(2.98) 
2.63 
(2.37) 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.14 
(0.68)  
1.08 
(1.06) 
1.46 
(1.52) 
1.01 
(0.98) 
Global Frequency 
of Rejection 
22.5% 
(0.1%) 
20.0% 
(0.07%) 
9.4% 
(0.13%) 
12.2% 
(0%) 
Average Offer 
Rejected 
2.4 2.9 2.1 1.7 
Table 3. Global statistics all periods confounded (last period) 
Overall, the results of ItoF and FtoF treatment sessions are in line with what is commonly 
observed in standard UG experiment. In fact, our results do support previous findings such 
that any offer below the 20% of the stake is rejected with a probability of (0,4-0,6) and that 
the average offers are between 30 and 40% of the stake. By contrast, what we observe under 
the treatment FtoI, but also under the treatment ItoI for the last periods, is radically different 
from the usually observed facts. Mean offers are low and, conditionally to these offers, 
rejection rates are significantly lower than what is commonly observed in standard UG.  
 
Offers and rejection decisions. 
Figure 1 reports the distribution of the offers and the rate of rejection. The subjects had the 
possibility of making offers with halves of dollars, but most of the offers were integers; 
therefore, in order to have more readable pictures, we pool the offers $0.5 with $1, $1.5 with 
$2, etc. Offers of $0 have not been observed and offers higher than $5 are very rare.16  
                                                 
15 Eleven couples participated in one of these two sessions. In spite of going successfully through both 
instructions and test of understanding, one subject misunderstood the protocol and sent to her opponent an offer 
containing the amount of money he intended to keep for himself. This happened for all the duration of the 
experiment. He sent proposals of $6 and $7. After having analysed the whole results, we decided to exclude 
observations concerning him (and related responses by his opponents), but we considered valuable the rest of the 
data. We could in fact verify that the misunderstanding of the subject did not sensibly affect the behaviour of 
players who met him when they played with the others senders  
16 Offers higher than $5 were observed with the following frequency : two observations out of 120 for the 
FtoF treatment, two observations over out of 180 for FtoI, 3 observations out of 180 for ItoF and 3 out of 180 for 
ItoI.  
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Figure 1. Offers distribution and rate of rejection by amount offered 
(The columns represent the percentage of offers and the curve represents the rate of rejection) 
 
The comparison of offers between ItoF and FtoI treatments is clear: the Indian senders 
were more generous towards French receivers than French senders towards Indian receivers. 
The average offer in the ItoF treatment is $3.92, while it is only $2.63 in the FtoI interactions. 
At the same time, Indian receivers were more conciliating than the French receivers. In fact 
rejection rates for offer below $3 is 19% in the FtoI treatment. The corresponding feature for 
the ItoF treatment is 55%. The difference between these rates can be ascribed to a different 
rejection threshold between Indian and French subjects. The different thresholds across Indian 
and French students are also confirmed by within-country treatments, where senders met 
receivers of same nationality. In FtoF treatment, the rejection rate relative to offers less than 
$3 is 60% while it is 25% in the ItoI treatment.  
From these results we conclude that the rejection threshold of Indian subjects is definitely 
lower than the French subjects’ one and that the difference between the minimum amount of 
money that a player is ready to accept is a relevant factor for understanding the outcome of 
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interactions. In addition, our data show that the rejection threshold is not common knowledge 
among players, even when one plays against someone coming from her same country. The 
evolution of proposition along the six rounds of the game can be explained by the fact that 
senders seek the acceptation threshold until they find the ‘right’ one. 
Dynamics pattern 
The round mean offer and the round rate of rejection for the various treatments are 
reported in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Offer and rate of rejection evolution  
(The circle curve represents the average offer and the cross curve represents the rate of rejection) 
 
To start with, it is instructive to see how the first round offer is very similar across all four 
treatments. The mean offer is around $3.3 in the FtoI treatment and nearly $4 in the ItoI 
treatment. Excepted for these two treatments, the comparison between mean offers by 
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treatment does not reveal any statistically significant difference (at the 5% threshold17). With 
the only exception of FtoI treatment, the observed offers are not different from what is usually 
found in this game.  
By contrast, we found that, when repeating the game, two different trends emerged 
depending on the receiver’s nationality, and irrespective of the sender’s nationality. In 
particular, offers made to Indian receivers decreased progressively over successive rounds 
while offers sent to French receivers almost remain unchanged from the first period. The 
pattern of offers over time can be explained by both the receivers' propensity to reject an offer 
and by the consequences of rejection and acceptation on senders’ following strategy. 
Concerning the latter, the reaction of senders seems to be quite homogenous (see Table 4).  
 
 Offer rejected in the previous period Offer accepted in the previous period 
Treatment Increase 
offer 
Maintain 
offer 
Decrease 
offer 
Increase 
offer 
Maintain 
offer 
Decrease 
offer 
FtoF 17 (68%) 8 (32%) 0 3 (4%) 49 (65%) 23 (31%) 
FtoI 15 (68%) 7 (32%) 0 4 (3%) 73 (57%) 51 (40%) 
ItoF 29 (85%) 5 (15%) 0 7 (6%) 73 (63%) 36 (31%) 
ItoI 10 (77%) 3 (23%) 0 19 (14%) 59 (43%) 59 (43%) 
Total 142 46 0 66 508 338 
Table 4. Offer evolution after a rejection or an acceptance 
In fact, senders increased their offer or kept it unchanged after a refusal, while they 
maintained it unchanged or diminished it when their proposal was accepted. At the same time, 
as said above, the Indian acceptation threshold is lower than the French one. Overall, we 
observe that treatments where receivers are Indian are precisely treatments such that offers 
fall over time18. Senders keep diminishing their offers without triggering any negative 
reaction on the other side. In the sixth round, the mean offer is ‘only’ $2.4 in the FtoI 
treatment and $3 in the ItoI treatment. 
When receivers are French, the story is completely different. In these sessions, refusal 
occurs more often whenever offers are below $3. By way of consequence, senders do not 
                                                 
17 The null hypothesis that offers are identical across treatments ItoI and FtoI is rejected by a Mann-Whitney 
test at the .05 level (P = 0.024). We can not reject the null hypothesis that offers are identical across the others 
treatments.  
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significantly vary their offer over the game and this is why proposed and accepted splits 
almost remain unchanged during the six rounds. In the last round, the mean offer is $3.7 in the 
FtoF treatment and is $3.9 in the ItoF treatment. A statistical test allows us to conclude that no 
significant difference exists between first round offers and last round offers for these 
treatments. 19  
From these findings, it appears that the repetition of the game, even with different 
opponents, allows senders to identify the threshold up to which receivers are ready to accept 
offers. Senders’ learning is made out in terms of offer reduction, which can be seriously 
sanctioned by refusals when the threshold is overcome. Thus, the last period offers integrate 
senders’ learning about opponents’ propensity to accept. For each treatment, the main 
statistics concerning the last period are reported in Table 5. 
 
Treatment 
ItoF FtoI ItoI FtoF 
Number of couples 30 30 30 20 
Average Offer 3.87 2.37 2.98 3.70 
Standard Deviation 1.06 0.98 1.52 0.68 
Global Frequency 
of Rejection 
0.07% 0% 0.13% 0.1% 
Table 5. Last period statistics 
Data reported in Table 5 show that proposals addressed to French respondents are in line 
with standard stylized facts in UG experiments. For the ItoF treatment, the mean offer is 
respectively $3.87. This observation is similar in the FtoF treatment, where the mean offer is 
$3.70. On the other hand, the last period proposals made to Indian are significantly lower than 
that. In fact, mean offers for FtoI and ItoI treatments are respectively $2.37 and $2.98.  
It emerges from the statistical analysis that senders make different offers according to the 
nationality of responders. In fact French senders’ proposals are significantly different when 
                                                                                                                                                        
18 The null hypothesis that offers are identical across the first and the last period is rejected by a Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-ranks test  at the .01 significance level for treatments ItoI (P = 0.0087) and treatment FtoI 
(P = 0.0013). 
19 The null hypothesis that offers are identical across the first and the last period is not rejected by Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-ranks test at the .01 level for treatments ItoF (P = 0.2993) and treatment FtoF (P = 0.4420). 
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they are to be received by an Indian or a French respondent20. Analogously, offers coming 
from the Indian senders vary with the respondents’ nationality21.  
For a more comprehensive analysis of the offer and rejection decisions, we estimate two 
panel data models since several decisions are made by the same individuals as sender or 
receiver. Firstly, we estimate a random-effects panel data model to identify the determinants 
of the amount the sender offers to the receiver. The independent variables include the 
treatments with the FtoF treatment as the reference and a time trend. Table 6 displays the 
results of these estimations for pooled data. 
 
 Dependent variable: Offer 
Constant 3.849167 *** 
(.2061954) 
FtoF treatment Ref. 
FtoI treatment -.8513889 *** 
(.2498054) 
ItoF treatment .4375 * 
(.2498054) 
ItoI treatment .0513889 
(.2498054) 
Period -.1057143 *** 
(.0203538) 
N 660 
R-sq. overall 0.1649 
Wald  62.35 
Prob >  0.0000 
Table 6. Determinants of the offer for the receiver (Random-effects panel data model) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** means significant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level and * at the 0.1 level. 
Table 6 confirms that the offer for the receiver is lower for the FtoI treatment and higher 
for the ItoF treatment, compared with the baseline treatment (i.e. FtoF treatment). In this way 
French senders propose a reduced offer when receivers are Indian. On the contrary, Indian 
                                                 
20 The null hypothesis that offers at the last period are identical across treatments FtoI and FtoF is rejected by 
a Mann-Whitney test at the .05 level (W = 302.5 and p.c. = 0.0000).  
21 The null hypothesis that offers at the last period are identical across treatments ItoF and ItoI is rejected by a 
Mann-Whitney test at the .05 level (W = 766.0 and p.c. = 0.0256). 
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senders offer more money to French receiver than French senders. We do not observe any 
significant difference between ItoI treatment and FtoF treatment. The time trend is also 
significant, suggesting that senders decrease their offer as periods are repeated. This result 
should be explained by the fact that, as shown below, receivers' propensity to reject unfair 
offers decreases with period repetition.  
Secondly, we estimate a random-effects probit model to identify the determinants of the 
receveirs' decision of acceptation, here again several decisions are made by the same 
individuals. The independent variables are the amount proposed to the receiver, the 
treatments, with the FtoF treatment as the reference, and a time trend. Table 7 displays the 
results of these estimations for pooled data.  
 Dependent variable: 
Responder decision of acceptation 
Constant -2.810967 *** 
(.5148294) 
FtoF treatment Ref. 
FtoI treatment 1.243329 *** 
(.3840941) 
ItoF treatment -.2507209 
(.3702512) 
ItoI treatment 1.04595 *** 
(.4005683) 
Offer for receiver .9937613 *** 
(.12414) 
Period .2181058 *** 
(.0537193) 
N 660 
Log likelihood -201.54314 
Wald  67.39 
Prob >  0.0000 
Table 7. Determinants responder acceptation (Random-effects Probit model)) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** means significant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level and * at the 0.1 level. 
 
As one can expect, Table 7 shows that the frequency of acceptation increases with the 
amount offered to receivers. The time trend is also significant: the receiver propensity to 
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accept increases as periods are repeated. It is possible to explain this time trend considering 
that receivers could be more reluctant to reject unfair offer as period are repeated and as they 
already reject previous offers. Compared to the FtoF treatment, FtoI and ItoI treatments have 
significant and positive impact on the frequency of acceptation. The impact of the ItoF 
treatment is not significant. These results suggests that Indian receivers are more willing to 
accept offers, even unfair, that French receivers, whatever the sender is Indian or French.  
To sum up, offers made to Indian subjects are, everything else being equal, more 
unfavourable than offers made to French subjects. Facing a French sender, an Indian 
respondent is confronted with lower offer than a French respondent. Similarly, an Indian 
sender is more likely to offer less when the receiving end of the proposal is an Indian, rather 
than a French. This finding is at odds with the view of justice as compensation, for which 
beyond-game wealth differences should matter. Also, our results do not validate the 
conjecture of equal nominal amounts division. Indeed, the (observed) splits in transcontinental 
bargaining are significantly different from the (observed) splits in with-in country bargaining. 
All these facts considered, we shall conclude that the relevant explanation behind TUG is the 
willingness to compensate for a difference of purchasing power between India and France; to 
reach this conclusion, a more precise theoretical framework is needed, which is developed in 
the next section. 
4. Theoretical framework 
Generalities 
Several propositions have been made in the literature to take into account fairness, 
altruism, status comparisons, and similar phenomenon which may be relevant in our context.22 
                                                 
22 Let us consider a bargaining game between player i and player j. Models of fairness can be classified as: 1) 
Model of Altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002) : the utility function of player i is 
increasing in the payoff of player j ; 2) Model of Relative income and Envy (Bolton, 1991, Kirchsteiger 1994): 
the first partial derivative of utility function of player i with respect to the ratio of i’s payoff to j’s payoff is 
strictly positive when the payoff of player j is inferior to the player i’s one and zero otherwise ; 3) Model of 
Inequity Aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 ; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000): player is altruistic towards other 
players if their payoff are below an equitable benchmark, but she feels envy when the payoff of the other player 
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For instance, in a two players game, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that individual i's 
preference linearly depends on i’s own payoff and on the difference between this payoff and 
player j's (the opponent) one. Their Homo Egalis23 maximizes the following utility function 
ui: 
  (1) 
Here yi denotes the payoff of player i, and yj denotes the payoff of player j. In the base-line 
model, yi is given by xi, the nominal pecuniary payoff of individual i. The parameter  
captures the equity concern when player i has less than player j ( >0) and  captures the 
equity concern when he has more than his opponent ( ). The models that we shall 
study are four variations of this model, suitable for our context. More precisely we will 
discuss different specifications of players' payoffs. Firstly, the payoff can be the nominal 
pecuniary payoff of the individual, or it can be the real payoff of the individual, taking into 
account the real exchange rate between the goods to be bought in the country of player i and 
the nominal pecuniary payoff. Secondly, referring to the theories of Justice, when the payoff 
includes out-of-game wealth, we shall speak of a Global theory whereas a Local theory only 
involves game payments. We therefore have four variations of the Fehr-Schmidt model. To 
present the possibilities for the game “payoffs” yi , yj, we always denote by xi and xj the 
monetary earnings of, respectively, player i and player j in nominal dollars.  
(1) The ALINom model (Aversion to Local Inequity in Nominal terms): payoffs are game 
earnings in nominal terms. Then, for player i: 
yi = xi 
Here we consider that the payoff is the nominal dollar earnings of the individual in this 
game. 
                                                                                                                                                        
exceeds this level. In the second of these two models, the utility function is assumed to be weakly increasing and 
concave in player’s own payoff; for any given payoff, the utility function is strictly concave in player’s i share of 
total income and obtains a maximum for equal split. 
23 Gintis 2000.  
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(2) The ALIReal model (Aversion to Local Inequity in Real terms): payoffs are game 
earnings in real terms: 
yi = i xi 
Here we consider that the payoff is the real payoff of the individual, thus i. is the real 
exchange rate between the goods to be bought in the country of player i and the dollar. In our 
case (and this point was recalled in the instructions)  is about four time larger for an Indian 
subject than for a French subject. We can let: 
I=1 and F=.25. 
 
(3) The AGINom model (Aversion to Glocal Inequity in Nominal terms): payoffs are after-
game wealth in nominal terms. 
yi = Ri+xi 
Here we consider that the payoff is the nominal wealth of player i, including both the game 
earnings xi and the out-of game wealth Ri, all expressed in US dollars. In our case (and this 
point was recalled in the instructions) R is much larger for a French subject than for an Indian 
subject. and obviously, in both countries R is much larger than the stake of the game (10 
dollars): 
10 <<RI << RF. 
(4) The AGIReal model (Aversion to Glocal Inequity in Real terms): payoffs are after-
game wealth in real terms 
yi = i Ri+ i xi 
Here we consider that the payoff is the real wealth of player i, including both the game 
earnings xi and the out-of game wealth Ri. Again, real wealth is much larger for a French 
subject than for an Indian subject and both are much larger than the stake of the game. 
Each of the models above can be solved. Each has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium. 
The complete solving of these games is tedious and is done in Appendix 2. It is nevertheless 
useful to describe the logic at work when solving these games with two figures. For these 
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figures, we considerer the ItoF treatment when an Indian makes offers to a French, utility for 
both players are represented. We suppose that the minimum acceptable amount by French 
player is $2 (which corresponds to a value of  for ) and that players payoffs are given 
by the nominal earnings.  
As a function of his nominal share, the utility of a player is always increasing when 
the share is smaller than the equitable share. This is because increasing the share not only 
directly increases the player’s payoff but also decreases the level of inequality. When the 
share is larger than the equitable one, the utility is still increasing if the marginal disutility for 
inequality is not too strong that is when β is small as it's represented in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. Utility of Indian sender and French receiver with the ALINom model in ItoF treatment and with small 
β 
 
In the opposite case, that is large β, the utility is decreasing because marginal disutility 
for inequality is not too strong compared to the increase of earnings (Figure 4). 
$0 $5 $8 $10 
uI, uF 
xI 
xF 
uI 
uF 
Sender's earnings 
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Figure 4. Utility of Indian sender and French receiver with the ALINom model in ItoF treatment and large β 
 
It follows that equilibria are of two kinds. For small β, the equilibrium is always that the 
sender offers the smallest amount that the receiver prefers to its reservation utility. That is, in 
Figure 3, the Indian sender should keep $8 and offer $2 to the French receiver. For larger β, 
another kind of equilibrium may appear, in which the equitable share is implemented. Here, as 
it show in Figure 4, the Indian sender should offer 5€ for the French receiver. In a given 
game, the equilibrium is unique. 
Model predictions 
In all what follows, the equilibria are described in terms of the nominal share (xj) obtained 
by the receiver. 
(1) The ALINom model 
The predictions of this model is that outcomes should be the same in all four treatments, a 
conclusion which is clearly invalidated by the experiment. 
(2) The ALIReal models 
$0 $5 $8 $10 
uI, uF 
xI 
xF 
uI 
uF 
Sender's earnings 
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The treatments ItoI and FtoF are not distinguished and one has: 
ALIReal[FtoI]< ALIReal[ItoI]= ALIReal[FtoF]< ALIReal[ItoF] 
 
Utility of Indian sender and French receiver with the ALIReal model for ItoF treatment and 
for small β it's represented in Figure 5. Symmetrically, utility of French sender and Indian 
receiver with the ALIReal model for FtoI treatment and again for small β it's represented in 
Figure 6. The smallest amount that a French receiver prefers to its reservation utility is then 
higher for the ItoF treatment than the one an Indian receiver accepts for the FtoI treatment. 
The ALIReal model shows several interesting qualitative features. For the ItoF treatment, in 
Figure 5, the predicted equilibrium is far from the equal split of the pie in real terms (i.e. 2$ 
for the Indian sender and 8$ for the French receiver) and, in this case, it is quite close to the 
fifty-fifty share. In other words, the amount the French receiver should get is significantly 
lower than the fair amount he could expect in a fair share in real terms. Things are different 
for the FtoI treatment. There, in Figure 6, the predicted equilibrium for the game with the 
ALIReal model is close to the fair share in real term. The Indian receiver's outcome at 
equilibrium is not significantly different from this fair share.  
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Figure 5. Utility of Indian sender and French receiver with the ALIReal model for ItoF treatment and for small β 
 
$0 $8 $10 
uI, uF 
θFxF 
uI 
uF 
2
.5 
1
0 θIxI 
Sender's earnings 
$0 $2 $10 
uI, uF 
θFxF 
uI 
uF 
2
.5 
1
0 θ
IxI 
Sender's earnings 
 27 
Figure 6. Utility of French sender and Indian receiver with the ALIReal model for FtoI treatment and for small β 
The predictions of the ALIReal model are in accordance with our findings. We do not 
observe a significant difference between the FtoF and FtoI treatments. On the other hand, the 
amount required by Indian receiver is lower for FtoI treatment and the amount acceptable for 
a French receiver is higher for ItoF treatment.  
(3) The AGINom models. 
These models predict that the Indians senders propose nothing to French receivers. This is 
obviously not in line with our data. 
(4) The AGIReal models. 
These models do not match observations in the trans-continental treatments, for the 
following reason. With the relative specification of inequity aversion, the inequity terms are at 
their maximum (  and ) independently of the player’s actions. They thus disappear in the 
solving of the game and the equilibrium prediction is (both in ItoF and FtoI interactions) that 
the sender keeps (almost) everything. This clearly contradicts our findings. With the absolute 
specification of inequity aversion, the prediction that Indian senders offer almost nothing to 
French receivers again contradict the observation.  
 We conclude that the present experiment refutes models of aversion to inequality 
based on Global or Nominal considerations. Models based on the aversion to Local inequality 
in Real terms are not refuted, in particular the model of Aversion to Local Inequity in Real 
terms. 
5. Discussion 
An important question in a multi-country setting is whether individuals belonging to 
different societies have different preferences for equity according to their culture. If one 
thinks that the only difference between this Transcontinental UG and a standard UG is that 
subjects have different norms of fairness due to their culture, the Fehr-Schmidt model can be 
assumed and the α and β parameters interpreted as tastes for equity specific to each country. 
This extended model would thus have 4 parameters rather than 2. But, is this required to 
explain players’ behavior? Our observations indicate there is no need to multiply the number 
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of parameters and that, instead, the original Schmidt’s model suffices, once the nature of 
payoffs involved in the negotiation is taken into consideration.  
There exist two reasons for which avoiding culture-specific models it is attractive. First, if 
norms of culture are specific to countries or societies, one should be able to observe them in 
the normal framing of intra-country ultimatum game. That is, as we have observed that Indian 
made quite substantial offers and reject only very low offers, we could extrapolate such a 
behavior and conclude that Indian are highly averse to unfair distributional outcomes as 
senders and lowly averse to unfair split as receivers. But if this was true, Indians should be 
equally highly/lowly averse to unfairness when they play against Indians. In other words, if a 
population effect exists and it is relevant, we should observe Indians making high offers to 
Indians and Indian rejecting low offers made by Indians with a low propensity. As we have 
discussed above, one can easily reject the first fact, although it is harder to conclude on the 
second. On the French side, the FtoF treatment shows that French senders behave as their 
Slovenian or American fellows (Roth et al. 1991), for instance, they will offer nearly the 
equal split in most of French-French interactions and reject more than one time in two an 
offer lower than 20% of the stake. Once again, this is not what we observed when French are 
confronted with Indians (at least, as far as concerns the sender’s behavior). Our intra-country 
offer data does not contradict the findings of Oosterbeek et al. (2004) in their meta-analysis of 
UG research on cultural differences.  
The second reason why models that detail the nature of the payoffs are important is the fact 
that it can be used to interpret a larger set of laboratory data, and in particular not only the 
data coming from transcontinental experimentation. Consider the experiment by Kagel, Kim 
and Moser, where senders and receivers were alternatively applied different rule for 
computing their final payoff. In the protocol, they specify a value of θ nearly equal to 3. With 
such a value and considering the same value for α ( ), our model can organize their 
observations: the estimated rejection threshold is about 37.5% of the stake when the sender is 
given the low conversion rate and 6% when the sender is given the high conversion rate (and 
β varies between 1/4 and 3/424). 
Finally we have to discuss the possibility that bargaining behavior changes across time. A 
plausible explanation is that a sort of dynamic effect operates complementarily to the Local 
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Equity norm. The specific norm of fairness that is implemented in a transcontinental 
ultimatum game needs some time to be operational and effective. Both players are likely to 
spend the first rounds of the game to partially adjust their behavior on their opponent’s one, as 
they need to improve their reciprocal knowledge; the discovering of the other is accompanied 
by the implementation of the relevant norm of fairness. 
The transcontinental protocol allows to distinguish between two factors: 1) the ex-ante 
status of the player and 2) the game status of the players. Usually these two elements are 
confounded as players are equal ex-ante: they are drawn from the same population and a) by 
implicit assumption, they are endowed with the same preferences—in particular with identical 
marginal utility of money—and b) by the means of experimental protocol, they have the same 
initial endowments. While in the traditional UG, the inequity aversion concerns can only 
intervene with respect to the “unjust structure” of the bargaining game, in our version of the 
UG players might make use of the game to impose a social norm that might re-establish the 
equality.  
Our findings are relevant for understanding which kind of norms of Justice are internalized 
by the individuals. The agents can consider interactive situations in two different ways. 
According to a first conception of Justice, the interaction is one small world within which 
equity norms apply. The interpersonal comparisons of utility are here performed at the level 
of marginal utilities involved in the experiment. We call “Local Equity” this conception. For 
instance, Local Equity could sustain the argument that an equitable division is one such that 
each participant can buy the same amount of good with the marginal income of the 
experiment. The crucial point is here that one can buy more with 5 dollars in India than in 
France.  
According to a second conception of Justice, an interaction is an opportunity to modify the 
situation of the individuals in some “just” direction. The interpersonal comparisons of utility 
are here performed at the level of non-marginal utilities, that is utility taking into account the 
individual’s status beyond the experiment, for instance her total income. Call this the 
“Compensation Equity” conception. Compensation could sustain the argument that an 
equitable division is one such that the amount of goods that participants can buy with their 
total income tends to be equalized through the experiment. The crucial point is then that only 
                                                                                                                                                        
24 The average offers for the first and second treatment were respectively of 54.4 and 24.2 out of 100. 
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allocating more to the Indians than to the French will go in the direction of equalizing total 
incomes. Our data show that Local Equity, rather than Compensation Equity, is the relevant 
conception of Justice for explaining the subjects’ behavior. 
We therefore reach, in the bargaining context, the same conclusion as Elster (1991) in 
other contexts: “...doctors and other specialist allocators do not see their role as that of 
reducing social injustice. They are specialized providers of specific services, not promoters of 
overall welfare. (...) If the specialists are aware that there is a bigger picture, they leave it to 
others. Often, however, nobody feels responsible for the bigger picture. The many local-
justice decisions that are made by different institutions can add up to a global injustice.”
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Appendix 1. Instruction (ItoF treatment) 
Introduction 
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment. The object of the session is to study how people 
make decisions. If you follow the instructions and make careful decisions, you might earn a certain amount of 
money. 
Currency 
The currency used in this experiment is US dollars. All monetary amounts will be denominated in this 
currency. Your earning in dollars will be converted into Rupees at an exchange rate to be described later. Details 
of how to make decisions and earn money, and of how you will be paid, are provided below. 
The decision situation 
In this experiment, you will participate in six rounds. In each round, you will be paired with another person 
and both of you will be asked to make decisions.  
You will never be informed of the identity of any of the people with whom you are paired, nor will any of 
them be informed of your identity.  
In each round you will be presented with a problem about which you must make a decision.  In each problem 
there are two decision makers: a sender and a receiver. You will be assigned either the role of a sender or that of 
a receiver randomly at the beginning of the experiment. You will keep the same role for all six rounds but will be 
paired with a different individual in each round.  
In this decision-making situation the sender must decide how much of a given amount of dollars, in this case 
$10, to send to the receiver. (Offers must be made in multiples of 0.5 US dollars). The receiver must decide 
whether to accept or reject the sender’s offer. If the receiver accepts the offer, then the receiver gets a payoff 
equal to the offer and the sender gets a payoff equal to 10 minus the offer. If the receiver rejects the offer, then 
both the sender and the receiver will get a payoff of 0. For example: say the sender chooses to offer the receiver 
x dollars out of the available ten, if offer is accepted, the sender’s payoff will be 10-x and the receiver’s payoff 
will be x, but if the offer is rejected both the sender and the receiver will get 0. At each round, the sender is 
paired with a different receiver and he has $10 available for the new offer. 
The people with whom you will be paired 
In this experiment, the other people who participate at the decision problem are French students who have 
very similar characteristics to you in terms of age, studies and so on. Your decisions will be transmitted via an 
Internet-Chat Connection, since they will be physically located in France. The experiment co-ordinator will 
provide the transmission. 
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How the experiment takes place 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be given an envelope. On the back of the envelope you will find 
your Identification Number (ID). Take care of that number, as you will have to use it throughout the experiment.  
In the envelop you will find: 
One identification card 
Six experiment cards (one for each round) 
The identification card tells you if you are to act as receiver or sender. 
If you are the sender:  
In the first round please take the first round experiment card and write down your offer. Then put the card 
into the envelope. The experiment assistant will then collect the envelopes. You will have to wait for 5-7 minutes 
(the time required to transmit your offer to France and receive the answers back) before the experiment can 
continue. Once the answers have been received, your experiment card will be retuned to you. You will find the 
receiver’s decision to accept or reject your offer as well as your income in that round. 
Before starting the next round, the experiment assistant will collect the experiment card. Once you have been 
told that the second round can begin, repeat the above steps. 
If you are the receiver: 
In the first round please take the first round experiment card and wait for some minutes while the sender’s 
offer is made and transmitted. The experiment assistant will collect your card and give it back to you with the 
sender’s offer. You will then write down whether you accept or reject the offer, put the card back into the 
envelope and return it to the experiment assistant. After this your income for the round will be computed and 
written onto your card which is then returned to you. Before the next round starts, the experiment assistant will 
collect the experiment card of that round. When you are told that the following round can begin, take a new 
experiment card and repeat the above steps. 
Warning : you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants at any time of experiment. 
If you do so, you will not receive any payment at the end of the experiment. 
 After the sixth round… 
Between the end of the sixth round and the moment of receiving your payment, you will be given a 
questionnaire about the experiment. The questionnaire is also part of the experiment and it is important that you 
fill in every part. The questionnaire is anonymous. You do not have to sign it, nor are you asked to reveal your 
identity. After completing the questionnaire, the experiment assistant will collect it and accompany you to the 
payment room. In this room will be a payment envelope with your ID on the back. Show your identification card 
to the assistant and hand over the experimental materiel you have been delivered with (envelop, pen, instructions 
sheets) in order to get the envelope. 
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How you will get paid 
You will receive 2 US dollars simply for showing up today and completing the experiment.  
In addition, you will receive a payment based on the outcome of the six rounds of the experiment in which 
you participated. Two out of the six rounds that you participated in will be randomly chosen and you will 
receive the payoff that you earned in these two rounds. For instance if rounds 3 and 4 are drawn and your 
payoffs in those two rounds were x and y, you will receive (x+y)US$+2US$ . The random draw will be done 
publicly, by using a dice, after the end of the sixth round (there will be two random draws, one for each country). 
How your payoff will be converted into cash  
The exchange rate that will be used to compute your final payment is the following: 
For every dollar that you obtain in the decision problem, you will receive 47 Rupees, which approximately 
corresponds to the current exchange rate. 
The French students will also receive 2 US dollars for their participation. For every dollar they receive in the 
decision problem, they will receive 1.1 Euro, which approximately corresponds to the Euro-Dollar exchange 
rate. 
To sum-up: both you and French students will receive the following payments: 2US$ for your participation 
and the payoff of the two rounds selected by the random draw. All the amounts of money in dollars will be 
converted into Rupees for you, and into Euros for French Students.  
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Some details about the purchasing power in the two different countries 
Here there are some details about the purchasing power in France (prices are on average): 
1US$= 1 coffee in the university campus 
2US$= 1 Mc Donald Cheese-Burger 
5US$= 1 cinema ticket 
8US$= 1 paper-back book (French pocket edition) 
20US$= 1 music-CD (e.g. international rock artist/Bruce Springsteen) 
Yearly 2001 GDP per capita in France: 23472 US$ 
Here there are some details about the purchasing power in India (prices are on average): 
1US$= 1 cinema ticket 
2US$= 1 meal in a medium class restaurant 
5US$= 1 music-CD (e.g. international rock artist/Bruce Springsteen) 
8US$= 4 English penguin paper-back books 
20US$= Fare for a return train journey (3000 km, i.e. 1500 km one-way) for 1 person 
Yearly 2001 GDP per capita in India: 473 US$ 
French students are given the same informations about the purchasing power in the two countries and about 
the exchange rate of Euro-Dollars and Rupees-Dollars. 
Thank you very much for your participation!!! 
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Test for understanding  
Please answer the following two control questions: 
 
The sender makes an offer to the receiver for the amount of 4 dollars out of the available 10. The  receiver 
accepts this offer. Thus: 
The receiver obtains……………… 
The sender obtains……………….. 
 
The sender makes an offer to the receiver for the amount of 4 dollars out of the available 10. The receiver 
rejects this offer. Thus: 
The receiver obtains……………… 
The sender obtains……………….. 
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Appendix 2. Solving of the games 
Here we find the equilibria of all the relevant bargaining games. We describe the equilibria 
in terms of the nominal share obtained by the receiver. In order to streamline the discussion, 
we each time write down in particular the solution if β is small. In order to simplify notation, 
we take one dollar as the monetary unit of the stake to be share, so that  and 
.   
1. Solving the ALINom model. 
The utility is given by the base-line formula (equation 1) of the Fehr-Schmidt model. The 
utility of player i as a function of her payoff is: 
 
If , the utility is strictly increasing with the payoff. In case of rejection the utility is 
zero for both players so the (only) sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game is that the 
sender matches the acceptation threshold of the receiver  such that 
=0, that is 
 
If , the utility is increasing up to  and decreasing after with a maximum at 
the equal split 1/2. In that case the (only) sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game is the 
equal splitting of the pie. The predictions of this model is that outcomes should be the same in 
all four treatments 
2. Solving the ALIReal model. 
The direct utilities are real payoffs, yi = i xi. For Indian player  then . 
For French player  then . It is necessary to study all four 
treatments. 
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 2.1. Treatment ItoI  
For this treatment, the model is formally identical to the base-line model. 
 
The prediction for this treatment is that the receiver receives .5 if  and receives 
 if  <1/2. Let this threshold be denoted: 
ALIReal[ItoI]= . 
 2.2. Treatment FtoF 
This case is the same as the previous one. For <1/2 : 
ALIReal[FtoF]= . 
 2.3. Treatment ItoF 
Let i denote the Indian sender and j denote the French receiver. The point of equal payoffs 
yi =yj is here , which corresponds to , and . For the sender: 
 
and for the receiver : 
 
 40 
If <4/5, the sender’s utility is increasing with her share  and the receiver’s utility is 
decreasing with  if >.2. Consequently the prediction is that if >4/5, the receiver 
receives .8 and if  <4/5 she receives: 
ALIReal[ItoF]= . 
 2.4. Treatment FtoI 
Let i denote the French sender and j denote the Indian receiver. The point of equal payoff 
is such that yi =yj, that is here , which corresponds to , and . For the 
sender: 
 
and for the receiver : 
 
If <1/5, the sender’s utility is increasing with her share  and the receiver’s utility is 
decreasing with  if >.8. Consequently the prediction is that the receiver receives .2 if 
>1/5 and receives: 
ALIReal[FtoI]=  if  <1/5. 
3. Solving the AGINom model. 
Here yi = Ri+xi. 
3.1. Treatment ItoI 
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The utility in case of rejection is . One can see that, in that case, the pre-game wealth 
cancels and the prediction is similar to the baseline model: the receiver receives .5 if >1/2 
and receives  if <1/2. We denote: 
AGINom[ItoI]= . 
3.2. Treatment FtoF 
This case is the same as the previous one. For <1/2 : 
AGINom[FtoF]= . 
3.3. Treatment ItoF 
Because of our hypothesis on the wealth levels, the difference  is positive, 
therefore the utility of the Indian sender i is: 
  
increasing with her share. Likewise the utility of the French receiver j is 
  
and her utility in case of rejection is . It follows that for β>1/2 the model 
predicts that the receiver (paradoxically) accepts only offers such that +β>0, that is 
. The equilibrium is that the Indian sender offers nothing. For β < 1/2 the 
prediction is also that the French receiver accepts any offer and the Indian sender keeps 
everything 
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AbAGINom[ItoF]=0. 
3.4. Treatment FtoI 
Because of our hypothesis on the wealth levels, the difference  is positive, 
therefore the utility of the French sender i is: 
  
which is increasing if β<1/2 and decreasing if not. Likewise the utility of the Indian 
receiver j is: 
  
and her utility in case of rejection is . If β>1/2, the equilibrium is that the 
French sender offers everything and the Indian receiver accepts. If β<1/2, the equilibrium is at 
the threshold 
AbAGINom[FtoI]= . 
4. Solving the AGIReal model. 
Here yi = (Ri+xi). 
 4.1.Treatment ItoI 
The model is formally identical to the baseline model. The prediction is again that the 
receiver receives .5 if >1/2 and receives  if <1/2.  
We let: AGIReal[ItoI]= . 
 4.2. Treatment FtoF 
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The utility in case of rejection is . One can see that, in that case, the pre-game wealth 
cancels and the prediction is similar to the baseline model: the receiver receives .5 if >1/2 
and receives  if <1/2. So we note: 
AGIReal[FtoF]= . 
 4.3. Treatment ItoF 
For the Indian sender: 
The Indian sender's utility is increasing with .  
For the French receiver : 
and the receiver utility in case of rejection is . The receiver accepts the offer if 
. If >1/5, the receiver (paradoxically) accepts only offers smaller than 
 and thus the equilibrium is that the Indian sender keeps everything for her. If <1/5, 
the equilibrium is also that the Indian sender keeps everything for her : 
AGIReal[ItoF]=0. 
4.4. Treatments FtoI  
For the French sender: 
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is increasing with  if <1/5 and decreasing otherwise.   
For the Indian receiver: 
and the receiver utility in case of rejection is .  
Note that , thus if >1/5 the equilibrium is that the Indian receives 
everything and if <1/5, the equilibrium is that the Indian receives nothing: 
AGIReal[FtoI]=0. 
 
